On forgiveness: Phenomenon and Norms by Abdelmasseh, Wassim
American University in Cairo 
AUC Knowledge Fountain 
Theses and Dissertations 
2-1-2017 
On forgiveness: Phenomenon and Norms 
Wassim Abdelmasseh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds 
Recommended Citation 
APA Citation 
Abdelmasseh, W. (2017).On forgiveness: Phenomenon and Norms [Master’s thesis, the American 
University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/176 
MLA Citation 
Abdelmasseh, Wassim. On forgiveness: Phenomenon and Norms. 2017. American University in Cairo, 
Master's thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/176 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more 
information, please contact mark.muehlhaeusler@aucegypt.edu. 
The American University in Cairo
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
On Forgiveness: Phenomenon and Norms
A Thesis Submitted to
The Department of Philosophy
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Arts
By
Wassim Sabry Botros Abdelmasseh
Under the supervision of Professor Alessandro Topa
 January 2018
The American University in Cairo  
 1
Table of Contents
1. Prologue 4...........................................................................................................................................
2. Introduction 4......................................................................................................................................
3. The Phenomenon of Forgiveness 5.....................................................................................................
3.1 Different Views on Forgiveness 5.................................................................................................
3.1.1 Ancient Greece 6....................................................................................................................
3.1.2 The New Testament 8.............................................................................................................
3.1.3 Nietzsche and Nussbaum 11..................................................................................................
3.1.4 Kant, Arendt and Derrida 14.................................................................................................
3.2 A Description and Definition of Forgiveness 19...........................................................................
3.2.1 What is Forgiveness? 20........................................................................................................
3.2.1.1 The Bond Model (What Forgiveness is) 21....................................................................
3.2.1.2 The Economic Model (What Forgiveness does) 23........................................................
3.2.1.3 Further Definitions and Clarifications 26........................................................................
3.2.1.3.1 What is Guilt? 26.....................................................................................................
3.2.1.3.2 What is Resentment? 27...........................................................................................
4. The Norms of Forgiveness 30.............................................................................................................
4.1 Conditions of the Moral Permissibility of Forgiveness 30...........................................................
4.1.1 Forgiveness in a Moral Framework 31..................................................................................
4.1.2 What About Repentance? 35..................................................................................................
4.2 Performative Conditions of the Actualization of Forgiveness 37.................................................
4.2.1 Truth and Narrative 37...........................................................................................................
4.2.2 Langauge 39...........................................................................................................................
4.2.3 Are there Unforgivable People? 41........................................................................................
5. Conclusion 44.....................................................................................................................................
Bibliography 46.......................................................................................................................................
 2
There are many people to whom I owe gratitude for making this thesis possible. Countless 
conversations with friends and colleagues have helped me think and rethink many of the ideas in 
this thesis. 
I want to thank Dr. Robin Weiss and Hussein Barrada, who on behalf of the AUC Philosophy Club 
organized a workshop for me to present some of my ideas on forgiveness while in the initial stages 
of my thesis. Many students and faculty were present at the workshop and the interaction with them 
was very valuable.  
There are, however, three people I would like to thank specifically. First, I would like to thank my 
advisor, Dr. Alessandro Topa for his enthusiastic support, his insightful critiques and his constant 
encouragement throughout this process. I would also like to thank my friend Dr. Maher Samuel, 
who has always been willing to read my ideas and give me feedback. His feedback has helped me 
refine many of my ideas. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Mariam who has labored along side 
me throughout this whole process, proofreading and commenting every single step of the way. Most 
of all, she has been a real example of a forgiving person.  
 3
1. Prologue 
In the summer of 1996, Tom Stranger met Thordis Elva. Tom, 18 years old, was an Australian 
exchange student in Iceland, homeland of 16 year old Thordis. Tom and Thordis fell in love and as 
boyfriend and girlfriend went together to the school’s Christmas dance. That night Thordis had too 
much to drink. She started feeling sick, vomiting and drifting in and out of consciousness. Instead 
of letting the security at the dance call an ambulance for Thordis, Tom decided to take her home. 
When they got to Thordis’ home, Tom laid Thordis on her bed, started undressing her and for the 
following two hours he raped her. A few days later they broke up and a little while later Tom flew 
back to Australia. Both Tom and Thordis struggled with defining and understanding what happened 
on the night of the Christmas dance. They both knew very well that something very wrong had 
taken place. It took Thordis nine years to finally reach a point where she believed that what 
happened to her was not her fault and that much of the suffering she had been enduring was a result 
of what Tom had done to her. She finally wrote Tom a letter confronting him with what had 
happened. Tom replied with a regret filled confession. That letter started an eight year 
correspondence until they deicded that they needed to meet to talk about what had happened. They 
decided to meet in South Africa for a week. Thordis wanted to find forgiveness and peace… and 
Tom needed to be forgiven.1
2. Introduction
The term ‘forgiveness’ denotes a social practice that is as common as it is complex. Even though it 
is such a common social practice, people will often disagree about what it involves, what its norms 
are, what it aims at and what value it holds. This disagreement is, at least in part, due to the 
complexity of the practice. It is a practice that usually involves multiple agents who are attempting 
to deal with a state of affairs that is characterized by strong personal evaluations and which has 
effects that can be very far reaching.
In one sense, forgiveness is a practice that most agents at some point realize their need for. 
This could be as a result of being hurt and feeling a need, a duty or a desire to forgive. It could also 
be a result of someone committing a deed for which they feel the need or desire to be forgiven. 
Many have experienced some form of forgiveness in their lives. Many might be limited to the 
experience of struggling with forgiveness while failing, or even refusing to give it. In a world where 
one is confronted with the realities of war and genocide, sexual assault and rape, even with disputes 
 Cf. Elva and Stranger (2017). Throughout this paper there will be quotations from Thordis’ and Tom’s book 1
at the beginning of some of the chapters reflecting some of the concepts and ideas being discussed.
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and arguments between family members or friends, the issue of forgiveness is likely to become 
thematic in our lives.
This paper takes a close look at forgiveness.  As the title suggests, this paper is divided in 
two sections. The first section provides a description and an understanding of the phenomenon of 
forgiveness. This is done first by considering how various philosophical accounts have done so. 
This is then followed by a phenomenological description of what forgiveness is and what 
forgiveness does. For this purpose the paper also considers other concepts that are related to 
forgiveness, namely those of guilt and resentment. In the second section of the paper the norms of 
forgiveness are investigated. Two elementary normative conditions of forgiveness are discussed: the 
conditions of moral permissibility and the conditions of performative actualization of forgiveness.
3. The Phenomenon of Forgiveness
3.1 Different Views on Forgiveness
The aim of this section is to provide a sample of a some of the different views on forgiveness. This 
is not an exhaustive survey of all opinions philosophers and other theorists have had about the issue, 
but it is intended to indicate the range of opinions that have been proposed. The first and second 
sections will show some of the diversity that existed in ancient times by showing how the ancient 
greeks and the authors of the new testament thought about forgiveness. The third and fourth 
sections will deal with some modern and contemporary philosophers who also have entertained a 
variety of opinions on the topic.
As the different opinions are surveyed it will become clear that a person’s understanding of 
forgiveness will differ depending on their general understanding of the moral world and their 
conception of human nature. For some authors, forgiveness would not be considered a virtue, 
because their ideas of perfection or goodness are such that the perfect or good person does not have 
a need to forgive. This is not to say that authors who do not think of forgiveness as a virtue agree in 
their understanding of the world, their conception of the human condition or in their understanding 
of forgiveness. However, these authors do hold ideas about the world and about human nature that 
lead them to conceive of forgiveness as either unnecessary or non-virtuous. Other writers, 
espousing different understandings of the world we live in and of human nature, consider 
forgiveness a very highly regarded virtue.
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3.1.1 Ancient Greece
“It is surprising and illuminating that forgiveness is not seen as a virtue by the ancient Greek 
philosophers,”  writes Charles Griswold. The reason this is so, is not because they think revenge or 2
resentment is better than forgiveness (as Griswold understands it), but because the idea of moral 
perfection in the thinking and writing of the ancient Greeks does not allow for forgiveness to be 
considered among the virtues.
To illustrate his point, one might look at the way Aristotle dealt with the topic. In his 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes what he calls the great-souled (megalópsychos) person.  3
This is an individual who Aristotle believes to have perfect virtue. A person who is perfectly 
virtuous is one who clearly has nothing for which he needs to be forgiven. It seems that he is also a 
person who has no need to forgive others. This person distances himself from those who are non-
virtuous. He does not “incline towards admiration, because in his eyes nothing is great, nor towards 
remembering evils, because it is not characteristic of a great-souled person to harbour memories, 
especially of evils, but rather to overlook them.”  This also means that when the non-virtuous do 4
injure or wrong him, their injuries or wrongs are ineffective against him. He is not vulnerable. He is 
“unable to live in dependence on another, unless he is a friend.”  It is worth noting that in Aristotle’s 5
Metaphysics, his description of ‘the perfect being’ or ‘the cause of all things’ is that it is 
independent, unmovable and unchanging.  Granted, he was not talking about a human being, but it 6
nevertheless does reflect his ideas about perfection.
The Greek word, syngnóme, which Aristotle uses and can be translated as ‘forgiveness’, is a 
word that has a wide range of usage.   Aristotle usually uses it in a context where it can mean 7
excuse or pardon.  He uses it, for example, when he describes how some people’s actions are not 8
voluntary but rather (in various ways) imposed on them. If that is the case, these people are to be 
excused or pardoned.   It is debatable whether or not this should be considered forgiveness. 9
According to Griswold, “[t]o forgive someone… assumes their responsibility for the wrong-doing 
 Griswold (2007): 2.2
 Aristotle, NE, Book IV, Ch. 3.3
 Aristotle, NE, 1125a2-4.4
 Aristotle, NE, 1124a1.5
 Aristotle, MET, 1073a5-14.6
 Griswold (2007): 3.7
 Griswold (2007): 4-6.8
 Aristotle, NE, Book III, Ch. 1.9
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indeed, what distinguishes forgiveness is in part that it represents a change in the moral relation 
between wrong-doer and wronged that accepts the fact that wrong was indeed done, and done (in 
some sense) voluntarily.”  If that is how one understands forgiveness it would seem that Aristotle 10
has little to say about it.
Griswold believes this to be the case in general with the ancient Greeks. After citing Plato, 
Aristotle, the Stoics and the Epicureans he concludes 
“that forgiveness (as distinct from pardon, mercy, lenience, compassion, and excuse) is not a 
virtue within these perfectionist ethical schemes … The character type on whom such 
theories are focused, and which they hold up as the moral exemplar, is perfect or like-the-
perfect, and thereby rises quite distinctly above the merely human. Forgiveness is more 
appropriate to an outlook that emphasizes the notion of a common and irremediably finite 
and fallible human nature, and thus highlights the virtues that improve as well as reconcile 
but do not aim to «perfect» in the sense we have been examining.”11
Gregory Sadler, however, takes issue with Griswold’s interpretation of Aristotle. He argues 
that it is not necessary to restrict what counts as forgiveness to situations where the wrongdoer is 
not pardonable or excusable. If this is so, then Aristotle has indeed much to say about forgiveness 
and it would be right to translate syngnóme with the term ‘forgiveness.’ Sadler sees forgiveness as a 
“choice not to engage in available responses of revenge and retribution… and giving up of negative 
affective responses and affective dynamics such as anger, hatred, indignation, distrust, or 
ressentiment.”  This, of course, is a possible reaction if a person has been wronged, regardless of 12
whether the person who has committed the wrong has done so voluntarily or involuntarily. 
In this sense, Sadler sees Aristotle’s great-souled person as a forgiving person. He believes 
that ignorance or involuntary action of the wrongdoer are among the reasons why a wronged person 
should not take revenge and should give up her negative emotions towards the person who wronged 
her. Sadler goes on to argue that forgiveness is part of the virtue of mildness or even-temperedness, 
which is “the virtue bearing on, directing and tempering anger.”  Indeed, if one accepts Sadler’s 13
definition of forgiveness and then reads Aristotle, one could see how Aristotle’s discussion of the 
anger of a mild or an even tempered person makes space for forgiveness. In fact, Aristotle writes: 
“The even-tempered person professes to be calm and not carried away by his feelings, but to 
be cross only in the way, at the things, and for the length of time that reason directs. And he 
 Griswold (2007): 7.10
 Griswold (2007): 14.11
 Sadler (2008): 232-233.12
 Sadler (2008): 241.13
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is thought to miss the mark more in the direction of the deficiency, because the even-
tempered person is inclined not to revenge so much as to forgiveness.”14
It becomes clear that how one defines forgiveness will play a role in whether or not one will 
find it in the writings of the ancient greeks. It seems that, linguistically at least, the greek noun 
sometimes translated as forgiveness was closely tied with many other related concepts. Therefore, it 
can be said that the greeks had a concept of syngnóme which one can understand to be in significant 
ways related to what some thinkers today would consider forgiveness to be.
 
3.1.2 The New Testament
In Before Forgiveness, David Kostan argues that in the New Testament “there is nothing like a 
systematic philosophical interrogation of the concept [of forgiveness] and seeking one is likely to 
be a frustrating exercise.”  It is understandable that one does not find in the New Testament a 15
“system philosophical interrogation of the concept” of forgiveness because the New Testament is 
not a systematic philosophical text. One will not find a systematic interrogation neither of 
forgiveness, nor of any other concept for that matter. The nature of the text, which consists partly of 
narrative and partly of letters written by various individuals to various groups of people, invites the 
reader to search for the concept in a different manner. 
Konstan also disagrees with Arendt, who believes that the “discoverer of the role of 
forgiveness in the realm of human affairs was Jesus of Nazareth.”  He believes that even though 16
we have in the New Testament “at least the germ of the modern conception of forgiveness,”  17
nonetheless “a fully developed conception of forgiveness as an interpersonal, human process is not 
yet present.”  It is important to note that Konstan considers a specific conception of forgiveness to 18
be the modern conception of forgiveness, which is very similar to that espoused by Charles 
 Aristotle, NE, 1125a31-1126a3.14
 Konstan (2012): 122-123.15
 Arendt (1998): 238.16
 Konstan (2012): 122.17
 Konstan (2012): 124.18
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Griswold.  It is this conception that he compares to what he takes to be the conception of 19
forgiveness found in the New Testament.
Even though there are only a few passages which directly address the issue of forgiveness in 
the New Testament, it can be argued that the whole New Testament revolves around the topic. It is 
generally agreed upon that the event upon which the New Testament is centered is the story of the 
life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The four gospels tell the story of this life, the letters are 
intended to be teaching the various christian communities how to live in light of that story. It is also 
generally agreed upon that, according to the authors of the New Testament, one of the main things 
accomplished through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is the forgiveness of sins and 
reconciliation with God. The Apostle Paul describes his whole mission as a “ministry of 
reconciliation” and clarifies further that “this is from God, who through Christ reconciled us to 
himself … that is, in Christ God was reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses 
against them.”  Elsewhere he describes what he believes God has done for the world as 20
“redemption, the forgiveness of sins.”  21
Even though this is clearly referring to God’s forgiveness, the Apostle Paul does seem to 
believe that there is a strong parallel between God’s forgiveness for us humans and our forgiveness 
for one another. He writes: “bearing with one another and, if one has a complaint against another, 
forgiving each other; as the Lord has forgiven you, so you also must forgive.”  In this sense, it is 22
possible to read out of the New Testament a lot of ideas concerning what forgiveness is and how 
one ought to forgive, not only from passages that directly talk about it, but also from the general 
narrative of the whole collection of writings that comprise it. The specific passages that do mention 
forgiveness should be understood within the context of the rest of the New Testament. There is no 
space here to deal with this issue in detail. Rather this section will only consider one of the key 
 A good summary of the conception of forgiveness espoused by Griswold in Forgiveness: A Philosophical 19
exploration is found in Nussbaum’s Anger and Forgiveness: “Forgiveness… is a two-person process 
involving a moderation of anger and a cessation of projects of revenge, in response to the fulfillment of six 
conditions. A candidate of forgiveness must 1. Acknowledge that she was the responsible agent 2. Repudiate 
her deeds… and herself as the author 3. Express regret to the injured at having caused this particular injury to 
her 4. Commit to becoming the sort of person who does not inflict injury and show this commitment through 
deeds as well as words 5. Show that she understands, from the injured person’s perspective, the damage done 
by the injury 6. Offer a narrative accounting for how she came to do the wrong, how that wrongdoing does 
not express the totality of her person, and how she is becoming worthy of approbation.” Nussbaum (2016): 
57.  
 2 Corinthians 5:18-19.20
 Colossians 1:14.21
 Colossians 3:13.22
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ideas concerning the conception of forgiveness which seems to be found both in specific texts and 
also in the greater narrative of the New Testament.23
In the New Testament it seems to be the case that God is deeply involved in every act of 
forgiveness. This is true whether one is considering God’s forgiveness or interpersonal forgiveness. 
This is expressed for example when Jesus teaches his disciples to pray: “forgive us our debts as we 
also have forgiven our debtors.”  In this instance, as in the previously mentioned quotation by the 24
Apostle Paul, God’s forgiveness for us and our forgiveness for others are strongly connected. The 
involvement of God in every act of forgiveness is also clear in passages which suggest that any 
action or attitude any one has towards another is related to a person’s relation to God. The Apostle 
John writes that “if anyone has the world's goods and sees his brother in need, yet closes his heart 
against him, how does God's love abide in him?… If anyone says, "I love God," and hates his 
brother, he is a liar; for he who does not love his brother whom he has seen cannot love God whom 
he has not seen.”25
It is therefore possible to see that the authors of the New Testament believed the love of God 
and the forgiveness of God to be the paradigm for the love and forgiveness humans ought to have 
for one another. The New Testament describes God’s love and his forgiveness as a gift given to 
humans “while [they] were yet sinners.”  The New Testament authors believed forgiveness to be 26
something one ought to do for others, not because they deserved it, but because they believe that 
God, first of all, has forgiven them (the wronged forgivers) while they were undeserving. And this 
forgiveness is a result of a love for the person who has committed the wrong. It is an action one 
takes in order to make reconciliation possible.
Taking it a step further, it seems that at the core of New Testament’s command to forgive 
is an awareness that God is a forgiving God and that we are people who need forgiveness, but 
who have also been wronged. Behind the connection between the individual’s asking God for 
forgiveness and the individual’s forgiving of others is the assumption that each individual finds 
herself as both the wrongdoer and the wronged before God. The Christian narrative then goes on 
to say that God becomes man and unites himself with humans in their condition. He becomes an 
innocent man who dies the death of a criminal. In his death as an innocent man he unites himself 
with every wronged, and in his death as a criminal he unites himself with every wrongdoer. In 
 It is interesting to note that the New Testament does not use syngnóme for ‘forgivneness’, but the word 23
that is in most cases translated as forigive/forgiveness is aphiēmi/aphesis.
 Matthew 6:12.24
 1 John 3-4.25
 Romans 5:8.26
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his death, all those united with him, somehow die as well. The Apostle Paul expressed it this 
way: “For the love of Christ controls us, because we have concluded this: that one has died for 
all, therefore all have died; and he died for all, that those who live might no longer live for 
themselves but for him who for their sake died and was raised.”  27
 The Christian idea is that God unites himself with humans so that in his death they die as 
well. Volf writes, “The Christ who died is the Christ who rose again. The [person] who died as a 
sinner with Christ was raised with Christ to new life… The person is a new self, because she 
lives in Christ and Christ lives in her.”  This is the experience that is usually referred to as 28
conversion. This new self is a self that is no longer guilty. It is a self that has experienced the 
costly love and forgiveness of God. It is also a self that sees Christ as taking on her wounds and 
sufferings. As one who suffers with her and is able to forgive, Christ gives her the power to 
forgive. As God unites himself with every wronged person, being himself wronged along side 
every wronged person, and being a God who is capable of forgiving, those who are united with 
him find themselves able to forgive as they imitate his forgiveness. Only God is big enough and 
powerful enough to forgive evil with the magnitude that is seen in this world, and it is therefore 
God who forgives and makes humans forgivers. 
 It does seem that there are things that would be too difficult and too costly for the 
wronged to forgive. The Christian narrative suggests, however, that human forgiveness is a 
reflection and an extension of the forgiveness of God. If this is true, then it might be possible to 
forgive even the kinds of evil that would have left people severely hurt and without hope. The 
Apostle Paul sums this up as:  
“Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation. The old has passed away; behold, 
the new has come. All this is from God, who through Christ reconciled us to himself and 
gave us the ministry of reconciliation; that is, in Christ God was reconciling the world to 
himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and entrusting to us the message of 
reconciliation.”  29
3.1.3 Nietzsche and Nussbaum
Friedrich Nietzsche and Martha Nussbaum are two philosophers who seem to have more of a 
negative view of forgiveness. Even though they would probably disagree on many issues, they do 
share a common rejection of the idea of forgiveness being virtuous. In order to understand their 
 2 Corinthians 5:14-15.27
 Volf (2005): 149.28
 2 Corinthians 5:17-19.29
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positions it is important to investigate some of the other concepts that are closely related to their 
conception of forgiveness, such as anger, resentment and elements of their notions of justice and 
retribution. 
Starting with Nietzsche, one can clearly see that forgiveness does not fit comfortably within 
his ideas about morality. He writes:
“… impotence which doesn’t retaliate is being turned into «goodness»; timid baseness is 
being turned into «humility»; submission to people one hates is being turned into 
«obedience» (actually towards someone who, they say, orders this submission – they call 
him God). The inoffensiveness of the weakling, the very cowardice with which he is richly 
endowed, his standing-by-the-door, his inevitable position of having to wait, are all given 
good names such as «patience», also known as the virtue; not-being-able-to-take-revenge is 
called not-wanting-to-take-revenge, it might even be forgiveness («for they know not what 
they do – but we know what they are doing!»). They are also talking about «loving your 
enemies» – and sweating while they do it.»”30
Nietzsche’s intellectual attitude towards forgiveness seems to stem from a similar root as 
that of the ancient greeks. His ideas about how one ought to live if one were to fulfill their potential 
do not leave any place for forgiveness. For Nietzsche, the strong man is not easily affected by what 
others do. In fact, “[t]o be unable to take his enemies, his misfortunes and even his misdeeds 
seriously for long – that is the sign of strong, rounded natures with a superabundance of a power 
which is flexible, formative, healing and can make one forget.”  When he describes forgiveness as 31
“not-being-able-to-take-revenge,” he is not saying that one ought to take revenge. But he thinks that 
the weak are those who want to take revenge, but are not able to and so; in order to hide their 
inability they pretend it to be a lack of desire to retaliate and consider this a virtue. 
Nussbaum rejects what she thinks is the contemporary common idea of forgiveness for different 
reasons. In Anger and Forgiveness, she begins by analyzing anger. She builds on Aristotle’s 
definition of anger, which states that it is “a desire accompanied by pain for an imagined retribution 
on account of an imagined slighting inflicted by people who have no legitimate reason to slight 
oneself or one’s own.”  She agrees with most of this definition, but then goes on to suggest that the 32
idea of retribution is one that, even though common, is irrational. She believes there are two reasons 
why people want retribution. The first is a result of a “magical idea” that when the person who 
wrongs me suffers, I will be better off.  Alternatively one can think of retribution as a way to deal 33
 Nietzsche (2006): 27-28.30
 Nietzsche (2006): 22.31
 Aristotle, RH, 1378a31-33.32
 Nussbaum (2016): 21-22.33
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with what she calls a “status-injury”; the idea being that when someone wrongs me, my relative 
status is decreased and therefore I am motivated to retaliate. Retaliation is then the means through 
which I will restore my relative status. Nussbaum describes this way of thinking as being “at the 
heart of infantile narcissism”.  34
Nussbaum then argues that there is a better way to be angry. Instead of anger having to focus 
on the suffering of the wrongdoer or on restoring relative status, anger should focus on social 
welfare “Saying, «something should be done about this,» [Transition-Anger] commits itself to a 
search for strategies.”  She calls this kind of anger “Transition-Anger” and thinks that this is the 35
road any rational person ought to take eventually. Other kinds of anger are human and are 
experienced by most people, however the rational person will quickly dismiss them and replace 
them with Transition-Anger.36
Having described anger in this way, she begins to explain how this is related to the most 
common ideas of forgiveness. Summing up her view, she writes:
“The «road» of forgiveness begins, standardly, in terrible anger over a wrong one has 
suffered at the hands of another. Through a typically dyadic procedure involving 
confrontation, confession, apology, and «working through,» the wronged person emerges 
triumphant, unburdened from angry emotion, her claims fully acknowledged, ready to 
bestow the grace of non-anger. That is what I call «transactional forgiveness,» and it is both 
enormously influential historically and very common today. It is plausible to think of it as 
the canonical form of forgiveness in today’s world … In short, forgiveness of the 
transactional sort, far from being an antidote to anger, looks like a continuation of anger’s 
payback wish by another name.”37
Nussbaum strongly rejects this idea of transactional forgiveness. She then suggests that there 
is a better form of forgiveness that is found in the New Testament. She calls it “unconditional 
forgiveness.” This is forgiveness that does not expect anything from the wrongdoer. They are 
forgiven whether or not they repent. Even though Nussbaum considers this a much better 
alternative, she still finds it lacking. To speak of unconditional forgiveness is to say that one is 
angry with the person, but decides to put aside her anger without conditions. For Nussbaum the 
problem remains that anger is not the appropriate or rational reaction to being wronged. Anger 
keeps the individual focused on the past wrong. She thinks there is still a better way to deal with 
wrongdoing.38
 Nussbaum (2016): 29.34
 Nussbaum (2016): 36.35
 Nussbaum (2016): 30-31.36
 Nussbaum (2016): 10-11.37
 Nussbaum (2016): 75-78.38
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The way that Nussbaum recommends is the way of “unconditional love.” In this scenario the 
wronged individual is not angry, is not focused on the past wrongdoing, but is mainly focused on 
what can be done for a better future. She thinks this strand is also found in the New Testament 
writings. She refers to the father in the parable of the prodigal son  as an example of this kind of 39
love. The father runs and embraces the son without any repentance or any calculation where we can 
see the father putting his anger aside. In such a story she sees no forgiveness, only unconditional 
love.40
It is interesting that Nussbaum will not call what the father does in the parable of the 
prodigal son forgiveness. Once again, we see that depending on how one defines forgiveness, one 
will or will not find it in certain stories or texts. Nussbaum’s analysis of anger and her ideas about 
retribution are also not without problems. She does think there could be a place for something to be 
done about the wrong, but only within a forward looking approach that is not rooted in the 
traditional Aristotelean understanding of anger.  This is however not the only way to think of 41
retribution. Neither is her way of thinking about repentance without problems. Thinking that 
repentance is merely about the wronged party finding restored status or the central condition for 
what she considers to be forgiveness is a very limited way of considering the phenomenon we are 
interested in.  
3.1.4 Kant, Arendt and Derrida 
After having considered the ideas of Nussbaum and Nietzsche (two philosophers who do not see 
forgiveness in a very positive light), this chapter will consider samples of modern and postmodern 
authors who hold a more positive view of forgiveness.  
Even though Immanuel Kant has written very little specifically about forgiveness, Konstan 
argues that it is with Kant that the modern concept of forgiveness (as Konstan understands it) 
begins. Konstan claims that Kant’s ideas “of moral autonomy and the consequent possibility of a 
radical change of character; and some of the paradoxical implications of this new image of the 
self”  have inspired and made space for the modern concept of interpersonal forgiveness.42
In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes: 
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“It is therefore a duty of men to be forgiving (placabilitas). But this must not be confused 
with meek toleration of wrongs (mitis iniuriarum patientia), renunciation of rigorous means 
(rigorosa) for preventing the recurrence of wrongs by other men; for then a man would be 
throwing away his rights and letting others trample on them, and so would violate his duty 
to himself.”43
The context of this statement is that of punishment. Kant begins this paragraph talking about 
the importance of punishment, but also about the problem of revenge. He argues that an individual 
has no authority to avenge crimes committed against himself, but that avenging the crime is the role 
of the court, which is a reflection of the ultimate moral law giver, who therefore has the authority to 
avenge crimes. He then reminds the reader that she ought not even ask God to take vengeance, 
“partly because a man has enough guilt of his own to be greatly in need of pardon and partly, and 
indeed especially, because no punishment… may be inflicted out of hatred.”  It is interesting to 44
note here the relationship which Kant established between forgiving and being in need of 
forgiveness oneself.
Even though Kant has written little that directly bears on forgiveness, David Sussman has 
attempted to reconstruct Kant’s views on forgiveness through locating a place for it within the rest 
of his moral philosophy and his religious writings. Sussman explains that Kant, in his religious 
works, writes of God’s forgiveness to us. Sussman argues that, for Kant, “God serves as a kind of 
moral archetype… If so, then perhaps the grace of God similarly serves as the kind of moral 
archetype for the kinds of morally transformative and restorative relations that might, in various 
imperfect ways, be within the realm of human possibility.”  Sussman believes that the view of 45
God’s forgiveness found in Kant’s religious writings can also show us something true of human 
forgiveness as well.
Sussman argues that Kant’s view of forgiveness can be thought of as considering the person 
who has done wrong, not merely as he is at the time of doing the wrong, but as he can potentially be 
in the future. When someone asks us for forgiveness “the supplicant asks us to trust in him enough 
to reestablish a relationship through which he may become worthy of that very trust, although 
nothing about him as he actually is now morally necessitates such an attitude.”  In this sense, 46
forgiveness for Kant has a redemptive aspect. Sussman argues that for Kant, to forgive is to believe 
that the person one is forgiving will become a person worthy of receiving that forgiveness. This 
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shared belief between the forgiver and the forgiven and the relationship it enables might actually be 
the cause of the person becoming worthy of the forgiveness.
Hannah Arendt offers a different perspective when dealing with the topic of forgiveness; she deals 
with the issue of forgiveness in the context of writing about political theory. Arendt writes about 
forgiveness in The Human Condition. In order to properly understand what she is saying about 
forgiveness it is important to understand her general framework in the book and how forgiveness 
relates to it.
In The Human Condition, Arendt begins by introducing a distinction within human activity 
between “labor”, “work” and “action.” “Labor is the activity which corresponds to the biological 
process of the human body,”  she writes. In other words, labor is all activity that an individual does 47
in order to provide for the necessities of her life. “Work is the activity which corresponds to the 
unnaturalness of human existence… Work provides an «artificial» world of things, distinctly 
different from all natural surroundings.”  Arendt calls “work” the kind of activity where we build 48
and construct unnatural structures within which we continue to exist and that may outlive us. Arendt 
then introduces the term “action” as “the only activity that goes on directly between men without 
the intermediary of things or matter, [it] corresponds to the human condition of plurality and to the 
fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.”  “Action” for Arendt is the human 49
capacity to create new human relationships. She thinks of “action” as a political activity; an activity 
that contributes to humans insofar as they live in relations to one another.
Arendt writes on forgiveness as an “action” that is the remedy for what she calls “the 
predicament of irreversibility.” Because “action” is creating something new, it is many times the 
case that the result is unpredictable and possibly problematic. What ever “action” we take will be in 
our past and the past is irreversible. It is a problem when we realize that the action we have taken is 
a problematic one, but we have no way of changing the fact that we have taken such an “action.” 
The solution for this predicament is in the fact that further “action” can be taken. One such further 
“action” is forgiveness.  Arendt writes: 
“[Forgiveness] is the only reaction that acts in an unexpected way and thus retains, though 
being a reaction, something of the original character of action. Forgiving, in other words, is 
the only reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, 
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unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences 
both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven.”50
Even though Arendt does not give a clear definition of forgiveness, she does state that to be 
forgiven means to be “released from the consequences of what we have done.”  For Arendt this is 51
significant because in “action” we do not know exactly what the consequences will be. This 
inability to know what the consequences will be is the main reason why Arendt thinks that an action 
is forgivable. In fact, she contrasts actions that are forgivable, because the actors “know not what 
they do,”  with willed evil, which she believes is very rare. In another passage she describes such 52
unforgivable actions as “radical evil,” and comments that “all we know is that we can neither 
punish nor forgive such offenses and that they therefore transcend the realm of human affairs and 
the potentialities of human power, both of which they radically destroy wherever they make their 
appearance.”53
Arendt goes on to explain that forgiveness is an action that stems out of love in a specific 
limited sphere and out of respect in the “larger domain of human affairs.”  This is because 54
forgiveness is always releasing an individual, for her sake, for who she is, from the consequences of 
an action she has committed. The action is forgiven for the sake of the individual who committed 
it.  This is why forgiveness, as well as trespassing, is a political action. It is an action that can only 55
exist among a plurality of individuals sharing one space of action and existing in a “web of 
relations”.56
Jaques Derrida offers a more complex and somewhat confusing view on forgiveness. In “On 
Forgiveness”, he begins by attempting to distinguish between a practice that is commonly called 
forgiveness, but that he considers to be impure. This is a practice that he does not consider wrong, 
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but that he does not want to confuse with pure forgiveness. The examples he gives of this practice 
are mainly political examples, where a process that is called forgiveness is undergone with the aim 
of reconciliation and moving forward. Derrida believes that pure forgiveness must be done with no 
other purpose in mind. He writes: 
“… each time forgiveness is at the service of a finality, be it noble and spiritual (atonement 
or redemption, reconciliation, salvation), each time that it aims to re-establish a normality 
(social, national, political, psychological) by a work of mourning, by some therapy or 
ecology of memory, then the ‘forgiveness’ is not pure – nor is its concept.”57
The way Derrida conceives of this kind of conditional forgiveness is similar to the kind of 
forgiveness Nussbaum writes about. In fact, he calls this kind of forgiveness which is only granted 
when the right conditions are met, an economic forgiveness. This is forgiveness that is granted “in 
the course of a scene of repentance attesting at once to the consciousness of the fault, the 
transformation of the guilty, and the at least implicit obligation to do everything to avoid the return 
of evil.”  58
Picking up the idea of ‘the unforgivable’ from Vladimir Jankélévitch  and Arendt, Derrida 59
begins to argue that “forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable.”  Derrida believes that this is the 60
only kind of forgiveness that is pure. The problem however, is that it seems that this pure 
forgiveness is not practically possible. He goes on to describe a tension that exists between the pure 
unconditional forgiveness and conditional forgiveness. “These two poles… are absolutely 
heterogenous, and must remain irreducible to one another. They are nonetheless indissociable.”  61
Even though he considers conditional and unconditional forgiveness to be totally different from one 
another, he seems to think that they are both involved when it comes to actually making the 
decision to forgive:
“… if one wants, and it is necessary, forgiveness to become effective, concrete, historic; if 
one wants it to arrive, to happen by changing things, it is necessary that this purity engage 
itself in a series of conditions of all kinds (psycho-sociological, political, etc.) It is between 
these two poles, irreconcilable but indissociable, that decisions and responsibilities are to be 
taken.”62
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It is difficult to think of what this looks like in practice. Derrida seems to want to save 
forgiveness from being an economic practice that has clear rules. It is important for him that 
forgiveness maintains its status as something that is in a sense impossible, and yet it is something 
that we must do. For him “forgiveness is not, it should not be, normal, normative, normalising. It 
should remain exceptional and extraordinary, in the face of the impossible: as if it interrupted the 
ordinary course of historical temporality.”  Commenting on Derrida’s views on forgiveness 63
Richard J. Bernstein writes: 
“Derrida in all his writings has been obsessed with decision and responsibility. The 
obsessive motif is that there are no algorithms, no rules, no decision procedures, nothing that 
we can rely on in making decisions – including decisions about when, whom, and what to 
forgive… When Derrida tells us that forgiveness is an impossible possible, he is not playing 
frivolous games with us. He seeks to intensify the experience of decision and responsibility 
involved in forgiveness.”64
Derrida’s view of forgiveness builds on and combines the views of some of the other authors 
mentioned in this paper. He brings together the ideas of transactional forgiveness and of the 
unforgivable and uses them to present a more complex view of how forgiveness works. As is typical 
of Derrida’s work, he deconstructs the binary framework that exists (conditional vs. unconditional 
forgiveness) and attempts to show that these contradictions must be held together in tension.
3.2 A Description and Definition of Forgiveness
Forgiveness is a complex social practice. One can think of a myriad of cases where it is appropriate 
to speak of forgiveness. Forgiveness can be seen to occur between two individuals, it can occur 
between one individual and a group of two or more, it can be seen to become enacted between two 
(or more) groups of individuals. An individual could forgive someone who is alive or someone who 
is deceased. An individual may wish for forgiveness from someone who is alive or from someone 
who is deceased. In some cases, one may experience the need or urge to forgive someone for a 
wrong that was not committed against herself. There is also the issue of the forgiveness of God for 
individuals, or in some cases some have even spoken of individuals forgiving God.  This list of 65
options is definitely not comprehensive, it does however show that there are multiple possible 
scenarios where one can appropriately speak of forgiveness and yet where it is possible to think of 
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forgiveness as having a slightly different meaning and perhaps also as being played out in 
accordance with different sets of norms.  
In order to properly investigate the phenomenon this paper focuses on what has been called 
the ‘paradigmatic case’ of forgiveness. This is the case where forgiveness is “understood as a moral 
relation between two individuals, one of whom has wronged the other, and who (at least in the 
ideal) are capable of communicating with each other.”  This is the most elementary case of 66
forgiveness and so it is methodologically advisable to begin with it. The paper thus will investigate 
what happens when an individual is wronged by another, and what the wronged party is doing when 
she forgives. The paper will also investigate what the effects of this forgiveness are on both 
involved parties. It is possible to then extract the conclusions of this investigation; on their basis one 
might attempt their application to other cases in order to discern in what ways these other scenarios 
are different and in what ways they are similar to the ‘paradigmatic case.’ This final step, however, 
lies beyond the scope of the present work.
3.2.1 What is Forgiveness?
In what follows, I shall argue that some of the confusion regarding the phenomenon of forgiveness 
has its origins in a certain ambiguity in the usage of the term ‘forgiveness’. ‘Forgiveness’ is a term 
used in two senses: one is a usage referring to something that happens only within the wronged. 
This can be seen when people talk of someone forgiving for herself, not for the wrongdoer. It can 
also be the only option in situations where the wrongdoer is no longer available in the life of the 
wronged. In such a situation, the wronged might attempt to forgive without any interaction and may 
be without any effect on the wrongdoer. The other usage is a broader one that is usually considered 
to be conditional and that includes reconciliation. This is the case when people talk of forgiving a 
loved one for example. This is forgiveness that is enacted for the sake of restoring a damaged 
relationship. A clearer case might be when the wrongdoer initiates the process of forgiveness. In 
such a case the wrongdoer might apologize and ask for forgiveness, hoping that, being forgiven, 
there might be hope for the relationship to return to the way it was before the wrongdoing. 
Some use the term as though forgiveness only refers to the first sense mentioned here, while 
others think that real forgiveness is only the second sense. In the following chapters an explanation 
of what forgiveness is and what forgiveness does is provided, which will attempt to reconcile these 
two positions by showing that forgiveness begins with the wronged and can even end there, but that 
it will always create the potential for the second sense. 
 Griswold (2007): xvi.66
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Brandon Warmke has argued that forgiveness alters the norms of a relationship.  There are 67
different norms that govern different kinds of relationships. These norms will be altered when 
someone commits an evil action. The norms, and perhaps even the nature of the relationship, will be 
different after such an action has been committed. These altered norms can be altered further by the 
action of forgiveness. The alterations of the norms may be accompanied by emotional alterations, 
but that is not necessary. The alterations referred to here are alterations in obligations, rights and 
prohibitions within the relationship in question. It is important to note that the alterations of the 
norms is not what forgiveness is, but it is the result of forgiveness taking place. When forgiveness 
takes place the nature of the relationship and the individuals within the relationship change as well. 
Forgiveness involves a change within the individuals that would make the alteration of the norms 
understandable and possible. Any understanding of what forgiveness is must account for the 
alteration of the norms that results as a consequence of its taking place.
In the following chapters, two different models are presented that attempt to guide us in our 
understanding of what forgiveness is. The first model, which I will call the ‘bond model’, will give 
an explanation of what is happening in the act and the process of forgiveness. The second model, 
the ‘economic model’, provides a way of understanding what forgiveness accomplishes within and 
for a relationship. Both models are compatible and will work together to give a fuller and clearer 
understanding of what forgiveness is. 
3.2.1.1 The Bond Model (What Forgiveness is)
“For a moment, we sit in silence, and it strikes me that in a way, we’ve got each 
other’s initials forever carved into our skin.”68
An evil action creates a bond between the wrongdoer and the wronged. By ‘bond’ I mean something 
that is holding both individuals together in a certain kind of relation. This bond (gradually) destroys 
other bonds that may have existed before the wrongdoing took place. It also destroys the potential 
bonds of a potentially healthy relationship between people who have never known one another. The 
bond has an impact on the person and thereby can also negatively influence other relationships a 
person lives in. This evil bond keeps people close to one another; this closeness, of course, is not 
geographical, but rather relational. The wronged and the wrongdoer can neither be separated from 
one another, nor can they create or sustain other healthy bonds with each other, unless this bond 
caused by the evil act is resolved. The bond can be observed in the wronged as resentment against 
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the wrongdoer and can be seen in the wrongdoer as guilt. It is possible that one or both parties be 
not fully aware of the bond at all times. This does not mean that the bond does not exist. 
Forgiveness is the act and the process of dissolving this bond created by the evil action. This act 
will alter the norms of the relationship in such a way that restoration of the relationship becomes 
possible. This could be through the reviving of previously existing bonds or restoring the potential 
of creating new bonds between the wronged and wrongdoer.  
The term ‘forgiveness’ refers to and expresses the idea of an act which a wronged party 
takes to properly remove a bond between the wronged and wrongdoer that was created by the 
wrongdoer through an action that can be properly described as an ‘evil’ action or a ‘wrongdoing’. 
The action of forgiveness aims at releasing both the wronged and the wrongdoer from the bond 
created by the evil action. However, it does seem possible for the wronged party to release her self 
from the bond through forgiveness without the wrongdoer being released. The wrongdoer can only 
be released from the bond when the wronged party has released herself. The release of the wronged 
party from the bond, however, is only a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the release of the 
wrongdoer. This suggests that the wronged is the one that holds the power to bring about the 
necessary action for the release of both parties from the bond created by the evil action of the 
wrongdoer. But there are other necessary conditions that the wrongdoer must fulfill in order for her 
to be released from the bond. These conditions, however, are not necessary for the wronged to be 
able to release herself. The bond is asymmetrical. Therefore, the action taken by the wronged party 
to release herself from the bond created by the evil action, with the intention of also releasing the 
wrongdoer, is called forgiveness, even if the wrongdoer does not fulfill the conditions necessary for 
her release. In this case, the wronged would have forgiven, but the wrongdoer would remain 
unforgiven. If the action of forgiveness is taken by the wronged and properly received by the 
wrongdoer, the natural progression is that of reconciliation. This explains why forgiveness is 
sometimes described in a way that includes reconciliation, while other times it refers only to the 
release of the wronged party from the bond created by the evil action. The confusion thus is a 
consequence of the fact that although forgiveness always aims at reconciliation, it does not always 
attain it.
The bond created between the wronged and wrongdoer by the evil action of the wrongdoer 
contains two strands of different directionality. One that moves from the wronged to the wrongdoer 
and another that moves from the wrongdoer towards the wronged. The strand that moves from the 
wronged to the wrongdoer can be described as being dominated by resentment and anger towards 
the wrongdoer. It is a desire that the wrongdoer, as the one responsible for the injury, not live as if 
she has not caused it. This is sometimes manifested as a desire for revenge. This is a desire to inflict 
pain on the wrongdoer with the hope that the inflicting of that pain would restore some kind of 
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balance and would somehow relieve the wronged from some of her pain. It is important to note that 
the pain of the injury is not itself part of the bond. The bond can remain even in the absence of the 
pain and the bond might be resolved even with the persistence of the pain. The second strand 
moving from the wrongdoer to the wronged is a strand of guilt. Having committed an evil action 
towards the wronged, the wrongdoer is now guilty. This guilt places the wrongdoer in a specific 
relation towards the wronged, similar to that of being in debt. Within the bond we can thus 
distinguish a strand of resentment and a strand of guilt. 
Once the wronged decides to forgive, she is letting go of the strand that is moving from her 
towards the wrongdoer. This allows the wrongdoer to begin letting go of the strand moving from 
herself to the wronged. However, the conditions for the wrongdoer to let go are (i.) the wronged has 
decided to forgive and (ii.) that the wrongdoer has repented. If the wrongdoer has not repented, the 
guilt towards the wronged remains, even if the wronged has released her resentment and her 
demands of the wrongdoer. In that case, it is the guilt of the wrongdoer that demands of her the 
payment. It might be the case that the wrongdoer is unaware of her guilt, or is unwilling to accept 
that she is guilty. This does not change the fact that she is guilty and that this guilt binds her to the 
wronged, even when the wronged is no longer bound to the wrongdoer. This explains how it is 
possible for the wronged to forgive, without the wrongdoer being forgiven. It is also possible that 
the wrongdoer repents before the wronged decides to forgive. The wrongdoer will however remain 
unforgiven, even though she has contributed her part in the process, until the wronged decides to 
forgive.
The ‘bond model’ is helpful because it provides a way of thinking about and describing the 
situation that makes forgiveness possible. It also provides a way of thinking about and describing 
the action and the process of forgiveness. Next, the ‘economic model’ will be introduced. The 
‘economic model’ provides a way to make intelligible what forgiveness accomplishes. It explains 
the alteration of the norms which is an observable result of forgiveness taking place.
3.2.1.2 The Economic Model (What Forgiveness does)
“As a result, I’m going to South Africa to seek final payment for the costliest night 
of my life”69
Richard Swinburne writes, “[b]y hurting you, I put my self in a moral situation somewhat like the 
legal situation of a debtor who owes money. The wrong needs righting. There is an obligation to do 
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something like repaying.”  This analogy between moral debt and economic debt is at the core of 70
the economic model of forgiveness. It is very common to find the language of this model of 
forgiveness being used when reading or talking about the topic. In the New Testament we find the 
language and imagery of debt to talk about sins.  Nietzsche makes a point of the fact that in 71
German, Schuld is the word for both guilt and debt.  Even though this is a common way of 72
speaking, Griswold, among others, has argued that it is not a helpful way of speaking of 
forgiveness.  More recently, Warmke has developed and defended this model against some of the 73
objections that have been raised against it.74
Undergirding this model is the idea that individuals have certain obligations towards one 
another. These obligations vary depending on the nature of relationship, however, there is, 
according to Swinburne, a minimum obligation to have the “attitude of seeking no harm” for 
anyone regardless of who they are.  When one wrongs another person, one is then in position 75
similar to that of being in debt. One is in the position of owing the person something; what exactly 
is owed is hard to define. One can think that one owes the person an apology, reparations, or maybe 
to compensate for what has been lost or damaged. One of the reasons it is hard to define what 
exactly is owed goes back to the complexity and variety in the nature of the evil actions that might 
be committed. Some evil actions include material damage, while others do not. However, in all 
cases we talk about the wrongdoer being in debt. It is the immaterial aspect of the wrongdoing that 
is very difficult to quantify. It is even conceivable that sometimes the kind of debt acquired is one 
which is impossible to repay.
The strength of the model certainly does not lie in the fact that it can quantify the debt, but 
in the description of forgiveness as a cancelation of the debt. There are parallels between the kind of 
relationship involved between parties in an economic debt situation and the kind of relationship 
between parties in a moral debt situation. More importantly, the kinds of changes that occur once an 
economic debt is canceled are similar to those that occur when moral debt is forgiven. It is precisely 
the latter similarity that makes the economic model of forgiveness helpful. Warmke acknowledges 
that there are disanalogies between the economic and moral debt, but he explains that “the issue is 
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not whether there are disanalogies, but whether such disanalogies prevent the [economic model of 
forgiveness] from being illuminating and helpful when thinking about the nature and norms of 
moral forgiveness.”76
Warmke suggests that the most helpful way to think about this is in terms of the norms of 
the relationship before and after forgiveness takes place. Once a person has wronged another, the 
wronged is justified in treating the wrongdoer in certain ways. She might be even justified in 
making certain demands of the wrongdoer. These demands would stem out of the wronged’s right to 
blame the wrongdoer. However, once the wronged forgives the wrongdoer, she seems to be giving 
up her rights to treat the wrongdoer in these same ways. Otherwise we would not be able to make 
sense of what it means that the wronged has forgiven the wrongdoer. These alterations in the norms 
of the relationship are the effect of forgiveness taking place.77
“Any plausible theory of forgiveness should be able to explain why the norms of interaction 
between wrongdoer and victim are altered in paradigmatic cases of forgiveness,” writes Warmke. 
He suggests that the way to explain these alterations is to think of forgiveness as having a similar 
nature as economic debt cancellation. When a person cancels a debt, she cannot go on treating the 
person who was indebted to her the same way (e.g. she cannot go on demanding payment from the 
person). The economic model of forgiveness therefore is a helpful model in understanding what 
forgiveness does. Forgiveness is an action of such a kind that it changes the norms of the 
relationship in a specific way once it has been taken. The norms are altered in such a way as to 
remove rights and obligations that would have made the possibility of the parties healing their 
relationship close to impossible (depending on the severity of the wrong). This does not necessarily 
mean that once forgiveness has taken place that the relationship is automatically restored. This only 
suggests that forgiveness effectuates a certain change that makes the restoration possible.
In combining both models one can now get a clearer picture of forgiveness. Forgiveness is 
the resolution of a bond that holds both parties in a specific kind of relationship. The resolving of 
the bond means that the nature of the relationship between both parties has changed in a way that is 
similar to the way the cancelation of an economic debt would change the relationship between the 
parties involved.
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3.2.1.3 Further Definitions and Clarifications
3.2.1.3.1 What is Guilt?
“I am one of the ‘they’… the ones who have inflicted such hurt. The ones to be 
feared. A bad man. A man who has committed sexual violence.”78
To call someone guilty is to say they have acted in a way they ought not have acted and that they are 
responsible for their action. This is based on the premise that under certain conditions, individuals 
are responsible for their actions. To talk about a person being responsible for an action is to say that 
it is right to require a response from said person in regards to the action she has taken. The person is 
the author of the act and she is thus expected to give an answer for it. When the action to be 
answered for is good we speak of merit or adequacy, and we speak of guilt when the action is evil 
or wrong. Therefore, we can say that guilt is a mode of being responsible. It is a description of 
someone who is responsible for doing something they ought not have done.
The person, being the author of her act, could be responsible towards (at least) three 
different parties. (1) The person is responsible towards the individual that is affected by their action. 
The affected individual has a right to call the person who affected her to account. (2) The person is 
also responsible towards the entity that is in charge of maintaining the laws within which 
communities are sustained and flourish. This entity’s right to call a person to account is a derivative 
right. It represents the affected in holding the effector to account. (3) Finally, the person is also 
responsible towards the entity that has given her the power and authority by which she has acted. 
Such an entity has a right to question the person about how she has acted using their power and 
authority.
The account of forgiveness given in this paper assumes the reality of guilt. It assumes that 
the wronged has a right to call the wrongdoer to account for their action. The wrongdoer’s guilt 
means that she cannot distance herself from the action she has done. The wronged has the right to 
treat the wrongdoer in certain ways because of the wrongdoer’s guilt. This is the situation that can 
be described using the ‘bond model’ and has been likened to economic debt in the ‘economic 
model.’
It is important to note that there is a difference between the reality of guilt, the 
consciousness of guilt and the sting of guilt. There are times when all three are present in one 
person. But there are times where one or more of them can be missing. A person may have a 
consciousness of guilt and feel the sting of guilt while not being actually guilty. It is also possible 
for a person to be really guilty while not having a consciousness of guilt. It has been argued by 
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twentieth century German philosopher Nicolai Hartman that forgiveness can release someone from 
the sting of guilt, but is not capable of releasing the person from the guilt itself.  This means that 79
whether one is conscious of their guilt or not, is not a measure of whether they are really guilty or 
not.
3.2.1.3.2 What is Resentment?
“My reflection in the window takes on the face of revenge: the cruel creature who 
wanted to bring my tormentor to his knees. Growling softly, she stretches lazily 
before meeting my eye. I licked your wounds, she purrs while flashing her claws. 
You think you have the right to judge me now? I turn away from the apparition, 
seeking solace in how far I’ve come through understanding and patience. Revenge 
grabs hold of my chin with bony fingers and forces me to face her. Admit it, she 
hisses.  You  enjoyed  making  him  squirm.  You’re  wrong,  I  hiss  back.  It  healed 
nothing.  Snarling,  she  retreats  into  the  shadows.  Her  presence  lingers,  its 
remnants pulsating through my body until sleep finally pushes me off the edge and 
into the subconscious of the African night.”80
Much depends on properly thinking about resentment when dealing with the phenomenon and 
norms of forgiveness. One reason for that is that it seems to be a promising way to describe what 
the wronged experiences when considering or attempting to forgive. Another reason is that 
forgiveness has been repeatedly defined as the forswearing of resentment.  It is therefore important 81
to properly understand resentment and to consider whether the forswearing of resentment really 
provides us with an adequate definition of forgiveness.
Pamela Heironymi has defended a version of the so called ‘Resentment Theory of 
Forgiveness’ in “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness.”  Hieronymi helpfully explains 82
that emotions, such as resentment, are “judgment-sensitive attitudes.”  By that, she means they are 83
not mere forces, but that they are undergirded by specific judgments. If one were to overcome such 
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an emotion, one would go about that by revising the judgments which undergird the emotion in 
question. She argues that an account of forgiveness as the overcoming of resentment…
“… must articulate the revision in judgment or change in view in a way that allows the 
forgiver to hold fixed the following three (interrelated) judgments: (1) The act in question 
was wrong; it was a serious offense, worthy of moral attention. (2) The wrongdoer is a 
legitimate member of the moral community who can be expected not to do such things. As 
such, she is someone to be held responsible and she is worth being upset by. (3) You, as the 
one wronged, ought not to be wronged. This sort of treatment stands as an offense to your 
person.”  84
 
The three judgements mentioned are necessary for justifying resentment. Hiernoymi goes on 
to explain that to deny any of these three judgments might in fact remove resentment, but it should 
not be considered forgiveness. This is because to deny any of these three judgments “absolves the 
wrongdoer of culpability, and to absolve of culpability is to excuse, not to forgive.”  Therefore, she 85
argues, we need to articulate an account of forgiveness that is uncompromising; one that includes a 
“revision in judgment or a change of view” without denying any of the three emotions that 
undergird resentment. 
The solution proposed by Hieronymi is to realize that these three judgments, when true, lead 
to a fourth judgment; “that the event in question makes a threatening claim.”  It is a threatening 86
claim in the sense that it makes a statement about the wronged and the wrongdoer. About the 
wronged it states that it is right to treat her this way, and about the wrongdoer it states that she 
thinks it is right to act this way. This claim, according to Hiernoymi, reveals something about the 
nature of resentment. Resentment protests these claims. Hieronymi argues that it is this fourth 
judgment that actually “grounds resentment.”  This fourth judgment can be undermined through an 87
apology by the wrongdoer. In an apology, the wrongdoer acknowledges that the action was wrong 
and that she should not have done it. An apology is an admission that it was wrong to treat the 
wronged this way. This would mean that the past action is no longer threatening. When this fourth 
judgment is undermined, “resentment loses its footing.”  Once the fourth judgment has been 88
undermined through the apology, resentment fades away. According to Hieronymi, forgiveness has 
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taken place. It is important to note that Hieronymi does not claim that this is the only form of 
forgiveness that exists.89
This account is helpful insofar as it provides a developed understanding of resentment. 
There are, however, problems with this account. The first problem, raised by Warmke, consists in 
the consequence that forgiveness is thus posited outside of the wronged's sphere of control. The 
overcoming of resentment is a result of the review in judgment, which is a result of the apology. 
Neither the apology, the review in judgment, nor the overcoming of resentment are actions that the 
wronged willfully takes. This would result in all norms underlying forgiveness becoming 
meaningless.  90
The second problem with Hieronymi’s account of resentment is that it seems to be 
incomplete. There is more to resentment than the issue of a threatening claim. If resentment is so 
central to forgiveness, such that overcoming it is what forgiveness is, one would expect there to be 
more to it than what is mentioned in this account. I would suggest that an important component of 
what we mean by ‘resentment’ ought to be expressed in an additional fifth judgment: the act in 
question has cost you something, and you deserve to be repaid by the person who has wronged you. 
This judgment is in line with the economic model of forgiveness. It is also easy to observe this 
judgment in the desire for revenge. The resentment the wronged feels seems to be demanding that 
the wrongdoer pay. Moreover, it is often the case that the wronged not only desires that the 
wrongdoer pays, but she desires that she herself make the wrongdoer pay.  In other words, it is 91
common for the wronged to desire a payment to be made to herself, not just that a payment be made 
in general.
This fifth judgment is not necessarily undermined by an apology. It is common to see people 
who refuse to forgive even when an apology is given precisely because they believe that the 
wrongdoer must pay. In the mind of the wronged, forgiving might mean that the wrongdoer will not 
pay. In such a case, even when there is no threat, the wronged will hold on to her resentment. This 
fifth judgment can only be undermined by an action. The wronged can decide to release the 
wrongdoer from the cost she owes her (the wronged) and accept to pay it herself.  It seems that this 92
action of release is a much better explanation of forgiveness than that of merely defusing the 
threatening claim. It might be fruitful then to either maintain Hieronymi’s account of resentment 
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while abandoning the idea that forgiveness is merely overcoming resentment, or updating 
Hieronymi’s account of resentment to include the fifth judgment and maintain her definition of 
forgiveness. In the former case, one could think of overcoming resentment as a part of the process 
of forgiveness, but that forgiveness includes more than that.
It is also worth considering whether resentment can have distinctions similar to those drawn 
in reference to guilt; can there be a distinction between the emotion of resentment and the objective 
state that justifies the existence of the emotion? In such a case one could explain how sometimes 
resentment is unjustified. One could also describe someone who is actually wronged while not 
being conscious of her state and not experiencing the justified emotion. The word resentment does 
not seem to be used except to designate an emotion, while the justificatory state is usually referred 
to as ‘being wronged’, ‘being injured’, ‘being offended’ and the like.
4. The Norms of Forgiveness
The following chapter is divided into two parts, each dealing with one of the two different types of 
conditions that come into play when thinking about forgiveness. The first type of conditions, I will 
call conditions of moral permissibility. The question to be answered here is: are there conditions 
that make forgiveness morally permissible or impermissible? In order to answer this question, 
forgiveness must be placed within a larger moral framework. This is because it is only within moral 
frameworks that any moral judgments can be made. The second type of conditions, I will call 
performative conditions of the actualization of forgiveness. The question this section will attempt to 
answer is: what conditions are necessary for the possibility of forgiveness in the first place? This is 
a question about what capacities or elements need to be in place for forgiveness to be an act 
possible for human beings. It will also discuss whether or not these conditions actually exist.
4.1 Conditions of the Moral Permissibility of Forgiveness
In the previous chapter the word ‘ought’ has been used multiple times. For Example, ‘guilt’ was 
defined as being responsible for doing something one ought not have done. The word ‘ought’ in this 
context assumes a moral framework. It is obvious that forgiveness is an action that makes sense 
only within a moral framework, even if only because it is a (possible) response to a state of guilt, 
which only makes sense in a moral framework. Forgiveness is, however, also an action that has 
moral value in itself. When thinking of the norms of forgiveness, disagreement can arise about 
whether one ought or ought not forgive. Settling such disagreements requires at least a sketch of the 
framework within which this moral judgment is made. 
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It is clear that people disagree, not only about moral judgments, but also about the moral 
frameworks within which these judgments are made. Many of the disagreements about judgments 
can be traced back to disagreements about moral frameworks. In attempting to sketch a moral 
framework I am not attempting to convince the reader that this is in someway the ‘right’ moral 
framework to adopt. Rather, I am attempting to provide a coherent moral framework within which 
the description of forgiveness I have provided can be tested and shown to work, and on the 
backdrop of which more general norms of forgiveness can be derived by considering a specific form 
of its enactment within the introduced moral framework.
4.1.1 Forgiveness in a Moral Framework
“To show the world that  people who’ve been both ends of  this  scale,  whether 
they’re receivers or perpetrators of sexual violence, aren’t soulless monsters or 
damaged goods. They’re people; imperfect, fallible, unmistakably human beings 
like  you and me with  all  kinds  of  thoughts,  jobs,  backgrounds,  life-styles,  and 
beliefs. People who pay their taxes and love their families and make mistakes and 
live right next door.”93
According to Charles Taylor, thinking about moral issues is thinking that involves what he calls 
‘strong evaluation’; “that is, [the issues] involve discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse, 
higher or lower, which are not rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather 
stand independent of these and offer standards by which they can be judged.”  Taylor argues that 94
moral thinking is done around three axes which overlap and are intertwined but are still distinct. 
These are “our sense of respect for and obligations to others, and our understandings of what makes 
a full life… [and] the range of notions concerned with dignity.”  In order for a person to be able to 95
make any evaluations or judgments regarding any of these axes one has to have a background 
picture, or a framework, out of which one is able to think about these axes and begin to make 
judgments that would be considered moral, or ‘strong evaluations’. Indeed, as Taylor points out, 
“frameworks provide the background, explicit or implicit, for our moral judgments, intuitions, or 
reactions in any of the three dimensions.”96
Taylor believes that frameworks are inescapable, even though some people might not be 
aware that they are acting and understanding their actions and those of others’ in their horizon. A 
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person usually begins to realize that she acts and conceives of her actions in a framework when she 
is in need of defending her moral position or an action she has committed. Because many people are 
never challenged to explain why they believe their action or position is right, they don’t realize that 
they act within a determinate conceptual horizon of practical intelligibility, i.e. of concepts, which, 
on the most fundamental level, are constituting the intelligibility of action for them. Taylor explains 
that “[t]he average person needs to do very little thinking about the bases of universal respect, for 
instance, because just about everyone accepts this as an axiom today.”97
Along these lines, I will develop a moral framework in this paper beginning with the 
following assumption: The greatest good, the summum bonum, for human beings is to be active in 
what I will call ‘good relationships.’ The framework developed in this paper is one that sees human 
beings as agents of such a kind who are capable of being in good relationships. This capacity is the 
outworking of being human, which is what makes them worthy of respect and gives them dignity. 
In other words, to be human is to potentially be capable of being in certain kinds of relationships. 
What makes a human life worth living is the kinds of relationships that a person is actually in, or 
can potentially be in. 
This does not mean that in order to be worthy of respect and dignity one has to be in good 
relationships, but that what it means to be human is to have certain characteristics that make it 
possible to be in such relationships. The fact that these characteristics can be deformed or lost does 
not make an individual less human, and so less worthy of respect and dignity, but it means that this 
is a human who is challenged in some way or other, and so finds it difficult to reach her potential 
and fulfill her humanity. Value and dignity are rooted ontologically not functionally. The person’s 
humanity is what gives her value and dignity and it means having such potential.
Out of this framework one can begin to see what kind of judgments and what kind of actions 
are good actions and which are bad. Actions that are compatible with and that build towards ‘good 
relationships’ are good actions. Actions that destroy the potential or capacity for ‘good 
relationships’ are evil actions.
Human Existence, – not only for sheer biological, but also for a number of other reasons – is 
a social mode of existence, necessarily requiring coordination, cooperation and communication. A 
social existence, in which we are constantly in need of, longing for and working towards good 
relationships. This does not exclude other goods that we long for and work towards, but it seems 
that all other goods are compatible with and actually enhanced by us being active in good 
relationships. To be successful, rich, powerful without being in good relationships is not a state one 
normally desires. It may be a state one settles for, but it cannot be described as the greatest good in 
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human life.  To be in good relationships when missing other goods is many times a more desirable 98
option than the reverse. This is intensified by the realization that to not be in good relationships will 
often mean that one is in bad relationships, as it is difficult to imagine human life without 
relationships all together. To live a human life without relationships altogether is a nightmare for 
most people. It is often the case that it is more desirable to be in a bad relationship than to not have 
any relationships at all. An individual who is active in good relationships will very likely also find 
herself in many shallow relationships. These relationships can be good, however they cannot 
replace ‘good relationships.’ Their presence adds to an individual’s life, but their absence is usually 
not strongly problematic.
A relationship exists when one person who is conscious of herself is also conscious of another 
who is not herself. The person is not only conscious of herself and the other, but has the capacity to 
act in such a way that would influence the other and can be influenced by the actions of the other. 
This requires that both persons exist within a mutual environment that makes the distinction 
between the persons possible, while allowing the persons to utilize said environment to act in ways 
that would influence the other. By influence I mean the capacity to act in a way that alters the ideas, 
emotions and even physical state of another individual.99
There are many kinds of good relationships, because there are many kinds of relationships. 
A person’s relationships to her parents is different from her relationships to her siblings, which is 
different from her relationships to her friends and different from her relationships to her lover. A 
person has the potential to exist within a matrix of different kinds of relationships, where each kind 
of relationship has different norms. All relationships might be important to the person and the 
person may love all the people with which she has a relationship, however the way she expresses 
such love and the rules and expectations in each of these relationships is different. A good parental 
relationship is defined by a set of norms markedly different from those underlying a good marital 
relationship. In other words, there are appropriate and inappropriate ways of influencing and being 
influenced by the other which vary according to the kind of relationship in question.
Being in a ‘good relationship’ is not the same as simply acting with goodness towards others. 
Acting with goodness towards others is a necessary component of being in a ‘good relationship’, 
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but it is not sufficient. A person can act with goodness towards others even in the absence of a good 
relationship. A good relationship is marked by depth (intimacy). The depth in question describes 
how much access and thereby influence the persons have in each other’s lives. Different kinds of 
relationships have different depths that are appropriate to the nature of that relationship. In order for 
good relationships to develop, a person must be willing to have access and influence in another 
person’s life, and be willing to grant access and be influenced by the other. This can be described as 
how much a person is ‘in’ the other. This is a beginning of a description of what communion looks 
like.100
In order for us to have the capacity to be in such relationships, we need to grow into certain 
kinds of persons; persons who tend to act with goodness, or in other words virtuous persons. To act 
with goodness towards another person is to act in such a way where the good of the other is the 
main concern. This requires not just an intention to benefit the other, but an understanding of what 
the good of the other person is. Not only do we need to have the good intentions and good 
understanding, but we also need to have the courage to act according to our good intentions and 
understanding, even though such an action might be costly. In other words, the kinds of persons 
who are able to be active in good relations are those who have love, wisdom and courage. To love is 
to want the good of the other, to be wise is to know what the good of the other is and to be 
courageous is to be willing to act for the goodness of the other, regardless of the consequences.
An evil action, one that makes a person guilty, is an action that is done with a selfish or 
careless intention. It is an action where an individual thinks of what she considers her good as more 
important than the good of those around her. This is what causes an individual to act in a way that 
violates or injures others. However, not any action that results in some kind of injury is an evil 
action. One can think of actions that cause some pain but are nonetheless still considered good. A 
person might accept being injured or hurt when it is clear that the pain is not done out of selfish 
intention. A person will allow a physician to injure them in order to heal them of a disease or 
ailment. 
It is also possible for someone with a good intention to act in a way that is considered 
morally wrong because of ignorance. Such an action could cause pain, but it is an action that is in 
many cases excusable. It could however be inexcusable if the wronged person believes the 
ignorance that caused the wrongdoer to commit the wrong to be inexcusable. In this case the 
wrongdoer is guilty for their ignorance more than for the action itself, but they are guilty 
nevertheless. It is also important to note that it is not only the injury or hurt that mean an evil action 
has been committed. It is not always clear what impact an evil action has on others. The impact of 
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some actions only appears after long periods of time. This is why sometimes some actions may be 
truly evil, even if we cannot immediately see their consequences.
Because of the kind of persons that we are (lacking in love, wisdom and courage), we are the 
kind of people who will inevitably wrong and injure one another. Unless an action such as 
forgiveness is possible, we have no hope for reconciliation. The paradox we find ourselves in is that 
we are creatures who find their ultimate good through being in certain kinds of relationships, but 
who at the same time find themselves acting in ways that are destructive to such relationships. 
Forgiveness and reconciliation describe the journey to restoration. Their existence is what makes 
community not only possible, but also sustainable.
Forgiveness does not seem to fit within a moral framework where the right thing to do is 
what is demanded by a list of moral laws. Even if one believes that there is such a thing as a list of 
moral laws, forgiveness seems to be an action that cannot be demanded of a person because of a 
specific law. In that sense it is not a moral duty. No one is considered immoral if they do not 
forgive. However, it is an action that shows that there is something beyond any moral law that is 
more significant than the law. That thing is to be in a certain kind of relationship with an other. To 
be in a ‘good relationship’ with an other is something that cannot be achieved merely through 
adherence to a law, but it is achieved through choosing to make space for the other within oneself 
and loving the other beyond the demands of any list of moral laws.
4.1.2 What About Repentance?
“Tom begins to cry. «I wish I could tell you why I did it, Thordis.» «Did what?» 
«Raped you» he says, quietly. I blink in disbelief that I heard him correctly. «What 
did you say?» «I raped you.» His words hang in the air, sharp as a razorblade. I 
want to reach my hand out and touch them. Having read his confession on paper 
does nothing to lessen the impact of hearing it spoken out loud like this, to my 
face.  Suddenly,  the  dam within  me bursts  and I  double  over  on the  bed.  «I’m 
sorry» he whispers. «Are you sure that’s how you want to put it?» I whisper back. 
«No, I meant forgive me. Forgive me for raping you, Thordis»”101
It is common to think of repentance as a condition for forgiveness. Eve Garrard and David 
McNaughton explain that “many people think that forgiveness should only be offered to 
wrongdoers who repent of their actions.”  It is thought of as the role the wrongdoer is required to 102
do in order to be forgiven. In Nussbaum’s account of transactional forgiveness she mentions 
confession and apology as typical aspects of the process of forgiveness. In her account this is seen 
 Elva and Stranger (2017): 119-120.101
 Garrard and McNaughton (2014): 97.102
 35
as part of restoring the status of the wronged. It is a “continuation of anger’s payback wish by 
another name.”  Nussbaum’s analysis of this process is influenced by her view of anger and 103
forgiveness in general. Since, for her, most anger is concerned with status, this form of forgiveness 
requires repentance because it is a way to fix the status injury. 
Another way to think about this is that repentance is not a condition for the wronged to 
forgive, but it is a condition for the wrongdoer to receive forgiveness. It is a condition for 
reconciliation. It is closely related to forgiveness because reconciliation is the aim of forgiveness. 
However, as argued above, forgiveness does not necessarily have to achieve its aim and it is 
possible for a wrongdoer to be forgiven by the wronged, yet remain unforgiven because she has not 
repented. In this framework repentance is understood as an action that changes the wrongdoer in 
such a way as to make it possible and safe for the relationship between the wrongdoer and the 
wronged to be restored.
The essence of repentance is a change of heart (intention) and mind (ideas). To say that the 
wrongdoer has repented is to say that the intentions and ideas that were instrumental in her 
committing the wrong have been replaced by intentions and ideas that are compatible with and 
support the (re)building of a good relationship between the involved parties. Through the act of 
repentance the wrongdoer shows the wronged that the required change in intentions and ideas has 
taken place. This is normally done through a confession, an apology and a promise. The confession 
is the act of affirming the narrative about the wrong committed and shows that the wrongdoer is 
aware of the problematic intentions and ideas that were involved. In the apology the wrongdoer 
accepts responsibility for the action, but also acknowledges the wrongness of the action. The 
promise should reveal that the wrongdoer has replaced the problematic intentions and ideas with 
benevolent ones.
In repenting, the wrongdoer is in a place where she can receive forgiveness. Forgiveness 
implicitly means that the wronged sees the wrongdoer as guilty. There can be no forgiveness 
without this recognition of guilt. In the same way, a wrongdoer who has not acknowledged her 
wrong can never receive forgiveness for it. To be forgiven is not only meaningless, but also 
insulting, for a person who does not believe she is guilty.  Repentance is the step the wrongdoer 
takes in order to begin releasing herself from the bond created by the wrong action she committed. 
As argued before, the completion of this release is conditioned by the wronged party releasing 
herself through forgiving. In other words, repentance is necessary for receiving forgiveness, but not 
for giving it. It is understandable that the wrongdoer’s repentance would make it easier for the 
wronged party to forgive, however, it is not necessary. This process emphasizes the fact that 
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forgiveness does not mean ignoring or condoning the wrong that has been done. In fact, forgiveness 
is only possible when the wrong is acknowledged as truly wrong. In the words of theologian 
Miroslav Volf: “To forgive means to accuse the offenders in the larger act of not counting their 
offenses against them. What does it mean to receive forgiveness, then? It means to receive both the 
accusation and the release from the debt.”104
4.2 Performative Conditions of the Actualization of Forgiveness
4.2.1 Truth and Narrative
“As a result, I prepared myself for all kinds of outcomes: being told that I was 
misremembering things; being accused of lies; a downright denial of the whole 
ordeal. However nerve-racking and unappealing, all of these possibilities seemed 
more desirable to me than the alternative, which was to silence my newfound voice 
after  it  had  made  such  a  daring  appearance.  Given  that  I  had  nobody  else’s 
footsteps  to  follow  in,  I  decided  to  follow  my  heart.  Despite  all  my  careful 
predictions, the only outcome I didn’t prepare for was the one that I then got: a 
reply  with  a  typed  confession  full  of  hot  regret  that  disarmed  me  with  its 
candor.”105
Forgiveness is an action (and a process) that takes place in relation to the narrative created by the 
parties involved about a certain action. It is not the action itself that created the need for 
forgiveness, but it is the narrative that surrounds the action to explain and/or justify it. It is easy to 
imagine how changing the narrative will change a person’s evaluation of an action. Some aspects of 
the narrative are easier to see and agree upon than others. For example, an important part of any 
narrative of a wrong committed has to do with the intentions of the wrongdoer. Another element has 
to do with the background story and information the wrongdoer had which lead her to commit such 
an action. It is always possible that there are elements to the story that the wronged is not aware of. 
It is also possible that the wrongdoer has faulty or missing information about the wronged, which 
play a role in her deciding to act the way she did. Therefore, it is possible that the action itself might 
be interpreted very differently by both parties. 
One possible situation in which the relevance of narrative becomes very clear is if both 
parties see themselves as wronged while being innocent. Each of them believes a narrative 
surrounding the action that results in their seeing themselves as innocent and the other as guilty. 
While it is easy to imagine how two people would both feel wronged by the other, it is more 
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challenging to imagine the same two people being innocent of wronging one another with regards to 
the same situation. If that is the case, it is very likely that these two individuals believe very 
different things about what happened and that they are probably missing or are wrong about some 
of the details in the narrative they hold about the situation. 
The process of forgiveness is then strongly influenced by the narrative each party creates in 
order to make sense of the incident in question. So far, it has been assumed that the wrongdoer 
really did commit an evil action against the wronged, that the wronged has correctly identified the 
wrongdoer and correctly condemned the action and that both parties agree on the narrative 
surrounding the action. There are however multiple ways the case could be different. It is possible 
that the wronged be mistaken in her belief about what actually took place. This could be a mistake 
about the degree of the evil committed or a mistake about the fact that the evil has been committed. 
The mistaken belief about the degree of the evil should be corrected in order for the process of 
forgiveness to be appropriate. If it is the case that there was no evil action, the correction of the 
belief will totally remove any need for forgiveness (and any guilt on the side of the supposed 
wrongdoer). 
It is possible that the wronged be mistaken in her belief about who committed the action. In 
this case the action has been truly committed, however the blame is placed on a wrong person. This 
case would result in reconciliation being very difficult, as the supposed wrongdoer would be 
unlikely to repent. However, it still may be possible that the wronged would forgive and thereby 
release herself from the bond. She will however have false beliefs about the supposed wrongdoer 
which will be destructive for the relationship. This problem would be solved by the truth of the 
innocence of the supposed wrongdoer being revealed. The real wrongdoer would be guilty and 
would remain unforgiven so long as they did not repent. 
It is also possible for the wronged to be totally unaware of the evil that has been committed 
against her. She might be aware of the pain caused by the injury without being aware of the evil 
action that caused the injury. In which case, she will not be able to forgive, but she will in some 
sense not be aware of (and may be even unaffected) by the bond created by the evil action. This 
would mean that the wrongdoer is bound to the wronged by his guilt. It is in such a case that we see 
the significance of confession very clearly. It is only when the wrongdoer confesses that the 
wronged is aware of the bond that needs to be resolved. The bond exists even when the wronged is 
not aware of it, and thereby the relation between the wronged and wrongdoer is affected by the 
bond. This explains why the guilt of the wrongdoer will sometimes push her to confess to the 
person who she wronged, even when the wronged was not aware of the evil committed.
This makes clear the value of confession and confrontation. In confession, the wrongdoer 
reveals the narrative she holds about the action in question. In confrontation the wronged reveals to 
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the wrongdoer her narrative about what happened. Confrontation not only reveals the narrative to 
the wrongdoer, but it also requires a reaction from her. Confession and confrontation are elementary 
practices to establish and unify the narrative in order for forgiveness to be possible. The aim of 
establishing narrative is not merely to agree on any narrative, but it is to agree on what is actually a 
true description of what has taken place. It is meaningless to confess and confront when truth is not 
the aim. A confession that reveals a narrative that the wrongdoer does not believe to be true is no 
real confession. A confrontation that reveals a narrative that the wronged does not believe to be true 
is absurd. What might happen in confrontation and confession is that both or either parties come out 
with a more accurate narrative, a narrative closer to the truth.
Without either confrontation or confession it is possible for both parties to have different 
narratives about what happened because of which they are not aware of the existence of a bond, or 
believe that a bond exists where there is actually none. Either confession or confrontation is 
sufficient if the narrative is accepted by the other party. The content of confession, when accepted 
by the wronged, is sufficient to establish the narrative and so make the process of forgiveness 
possible. The content of confrontation, if accepted by the wrongdoer, is also sufficient to establish 
the necessary narrative. If the content of the confrontation is not accepted, then no reconciliation 
will be possible, the wronged can however still forgive (release herself from the bond, while the 
wrongdoer remains bound). When the content of confession is accepted and if the wrongdoer also 
apologizes and promises to act differently, the wronged is now in a position to continue further with 
the process leading to reconciliation.
4.2.2 Langauge
“In an attempt to give voice to my feelings, I wrote a disgustingly violent poem… It 
doesn’t reflect how I feel today, not by a long shot, but it expresses some of the 
things I wanted to say to you when I was at my lowest.”106
Taking this issue of narrative a step deeper, it is clear that there can be no narrative without 
language. In fact, there can be no narrative of the kind that makes forgiveness possible if we were 
not the kinds of beings whom Taylor describes as ‘self-interpreting animals.’ For Taylor, we are the 
kinds of beings we are because of our capacity for language. We are the kinds of beings who 
experience specific emotions that we could have never experienced had we no language. Any 
narrative we live within does not only tell of events, but it is a narrative that involves certain 
emotions about these events. Taylor writes: 
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“But then we must speak of man as a self-interpreting being, because this kind of 
interpretation is not an optional extra, but is an essential part of our existence. For our 
feelings always incorporate certain articulations; while just because they do so they open us 
on to a domain of imports which call for further articulation. The attempt to articulate 
further is potentially a life-time process. At each stage, what we feel is a function of what we 
have already articulated and evokes the puzzlement and perplexities which further 
understanding may unravel. But whether we want to take the challenge or not, whether we 
seek the truth or take refuge in illusion, our self-(mis)understandings shape what we feel. 
This is the sense in which man is a self-interpreting animal.”107
Taylor distinguishes between different kinds of emotions we experience. There are what he 
calls immediate emotions which are language independent, such as “what we experience in the 
dentist's chair, or when the fingernail is rubbed along the blackboard.”  These are emotions that 108
we share with non-language animals. Two other types of emotions are ones that have what he calls 
‘non-subject referring imports’ and those that have ‘subject-referring imports.’ Taylor defines 
‘import’ as “a way in which something can be relevant or of importance to the desires or purposes 
or aspirations or feelings of a subject; or otherwise put, a property of something whereby it is a 
matter of non-indifference to a subject.”  He uses the term ‘subject-referring’ to describe 109
“properties which can only exist in a world in which there are subjects of experience.”  The idea is 110
that there are emotions that can only be made sense of when thinking of humans as subjects 
constituting their social reality and not merely as objects. These emotions cannot be described or 
explained in purely objectivistic terms. 
To understand the difference between the latter two kinds of emotions, Taylor invites the 
reader to imagine attempting to explain the emotion of fear and of shame to Alpha Centaurans, 
“who as everybody knows are large gaseous clouds, somehow endowed with sapience, but 
unrecognizable by us as living beings, lacking what we think of as sense organs, lacking our notion 
of individuality (they agglomerate and redivide in all sorts of ways).”  We would be able to find 111
ways to describe fear in objective terms; terms we have in common with the Alpha Centaurans. We 
could attempt to reduce fear to a recognition of some kind of danger, which a machine could be 
designed to imitate. This would be much more challenging with the emotion of shame. This is 
because “the term 'shameful' has no sense outside of a world in which there is a subject for whom 
things have certain (emotional) meanings. For the (linguistic) meaning of 'shameful' can only be 
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explicated with reference to a subject for whom these (emotional) meanings have weight, and if 
there were no such subjects, the term itself would lack sense.”112
Taylor sees emotions that are subject-referring and import-attributing as emotions that we 
are only capable of as language animals. This is because our articulation of emotions shapes and 
reshapes our emotions. “Language is constitutive of emotion” which means that for Taylor 
“experiencing an emotion essentially involves seeing that certain descriptions apply.”   Such 113
descriptions, which are essential for something to have import, are not possible without language. 
Furthermore, these emotions involve what Taylor calls strong evaluation; that is evaluation that 
involves “discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse, higher or lower.”  Taylor argues that 114
language is necessary for any strong evaluation.  115
These emotions seem to be the kind of emotions that are fundamental to any narrative that 
calls for forgiveness. Forgiveness is only an issue when there is a situation that involves emotions 
which result from things that are relevant and important to us, i.e. things that have import. We can 
only experience such emotions as people who use language. These emotions are also all emotions 
that involve strong evaluation. We experience resentment if we believe we have been treated 
wrongly. We experience guilt when we believe we have acted in a way that we ought not have acted 
in. We sense an obligation to treat people in certain ways and not in others. We find it good to be in 
certain kinds of relationships with others and we find it bad when relationships are of other kinds. 
Forgiveness is therefore only possible for beings like us, who have the capacity for language.     
4.2.3 Are there Unforgivable People?
“Unforgivable. The word rings in my ears. I’m going to [visit] a prison where 
innocent people’s rights were violated in the most gruesome ways. I’m going there 
with a man who raped me. And on my way, I cross paths with a man who thinks it’s 
unforgivable that another motorist nudged his scooter.”116
The first common answer to the question of whether there are unforgivable people is that 
unrepentant wrongdoers are unforgivable. The understanding of forgiveness put forward in this 
paper however suggests that the wronged can forgive without the repentance of the wrongdoer. 
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Regarding the question of whether there are wrongs that are of such kind, that forgiving them would 
be morally wrong, I would like to suggest that there are no wrongs that make forgiveness morally 
wrong, but that there are wrongs that would make forgiveness, in the absence of any divine 
assistance, impossible. Forgiveness is an action and a process that not only has a strong moral 
dimension, but it is one that is almost always very costly. It is because of its cost that it can be at 
times humanly impossible.
So far this paper has been exploring the structure of forgiveness. This structure is constant to 
a great degree throughout the different possible cases of paradigmatic forgiveness. Forgiveness (of 
this kind) only exists when a person commits an evil action, thus becoming the wrongdoer, against 
another person, who becomes the wronged. The wronged is also the person who has the right to 
forgive. Forgiveness cannot be demanded of her, but she can also never be blamed for forgiving, 
that is, as long as the understanding of forgiveness is one that says that forgiveness makes 
reconciliation possible, aims at reconciliation, but is not sufficient for reconciliation to take place. It 
is conceivable that a wronged person who rushes into reconciliation without repentance is doing 
something that is morally questionable, or at least foolish. What remains to be answered are not 
questions regarding the structure or categories of the action and the process of forgiveness, but 
whether the degree and kind of the evil act can make it impossible for someone to forgive. 
The idea of forgiveness being costly is based primarily on two observations. First, it is 
commonly believed that forgiveness is very difficult. Its difficulty is proportional to the non-
numerical ‘magnitude’ of the evil act. This suggests that the effort and pain of forgiving stand in a 
relation of direct proportionality to the non-numerical ‘magnitude’ of the evil committed. Because 
there is such a relationship between the ‘magnitude’ of the wrong and the difficulty of forgiveness, 
it makes sense to think of forgiveness as having a variable cost. Obviously the question of the 
magnitude of evil has a very subjective element to it. It could vary depending on the depth of the 
relationship between the parties involved, the moral framework the wronged holds and what she 
believes is truly important in her life. 
Secondly, forgiveness is often described as releasing someone from a debt and as a gift. The 
reason these descriptions have been used for so long in different languages and cultures, is probably 
because they help us represent to ourselves what it means to forgive. The language of debt suggests 
that by forgiving, the wronged is choosing to forgo receiving that which she rightfully demands. As 
argued earlier, to overcome resentment is to decide to bear the weight of the wrong committed 
against oneself and to not demand it from the wrongdoer. To forgive a debt, is to bear the weight of 
that debt oneself. The language of forgiveness being a gift also implicitly says that it is costly. And 
depending on the size of the gift, it will cost more or less. The difference between the analogies and 
the reality of forgiveness is that it is easy to understand and to determine the cost of forgiving a debt 
 42
or of giving a gift, while with forgiveness the cost is very difficult to quantify. The cost could be 
living without things or people that were very important in a person’s life. It could be that the 
wronged is accepting that her life will never be the same. It also could be her accepting that, for 
perhaps an indefinite period of time, she will live with various kinds of suffering. Depending on the 
cost, forgiveness could be the greatest gift a person has given in her life. Heironymi expresses this 
idea beautifully:
“any wrongdoing leaves in its wake some amount of damage or cost, be it physical, 
financial, emotional, relational, or social. This is damage which the offender usually cannot 
repair («you can't take it back,» as children learn), and which the offended will, in any case, 
incur. The persistence of the damage threatens any attempt to leave the past in the past, 
insofar as the damage testifies to the deed. The persisting damage cannot be addressed in the 
same way as the persisting meaning or guilt. So here's a further thing left for forgiveness to 
do: With forgiveness, the offended agrees to bear in her own person the cost of the 
wrongdoing and to incorporate the injury into her own life without further protest and 
without demand for retribution. (In some cases forgiveness can be uncomfortably intimate: 
You must allow me to creatively incorporate the scars that bear your fingerprints into the 
permanent fabric of my life, and trust that I can do so.)”117
This also shows why forgiveness is an act of love. It is choosing to bear a price in order to 
release some one else of it. In fact, it is in order to release the one who has committed the wrong. It 
is an act of sacrifice done for someone who is very easily seen as an enemy. This is why we are 
more willing to forgive someone who we deeply love, as long as we love them enough to bear the 
cost of forgiveness. A parent is many times willing to forgive their child for very costly mistakes. 
They are willing to endure and bear a lot of pain in order to release their child from any debt they 
may owe them. In fact, many times they don’t even consider it as a debt, because the default 
position is to forgive no matter how costly. It may be so because the relationship between parents 
and children is inherently asymmetrical. Parents are expecting to pay high costs for the sake of their 
children while expecting very little back. The readiness of most parents to forgive thus reveals 
something of the nature of forgiveness. Many people find that they do not have the power to love 
the other in such a way. They find it practically impossible to forgive and to release the wrongdoer 
from their debt.
When the wronged doesn’t forgive, she continues on demanding the price of the wrong 
committed against her from the wrongdoer. She does not accept that she is paying a price for an 
action she did not decide to take and one that she does not deserve to be the recipient of. It makes 
sense to think that the wrongdoer should be the one paying. The reality, however, is that sometimes 
the wrongdoer will never be able to pay in a way that would restore the wronged. The effect of the 
evil action could be of such a kind that is irreversible. In that case, the debt is permanent. This may 
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result in the wronged wanting the wrongdoer to suffer, even if it will not lead to any restoration.  At 
least it is an acknowledgment that what the wronged is forced to pay for is not her fault and that the 
other person is also paying a price.
Furthermore, to not forgive could mean that the wronged is holding on to the belief that one 
day the wrongdoer will be made to pay, and that the wrongdoer’s payment will somehow restore the 
wronged. Even though this belief is many times clearly irrational and unrealistic, it is still 
frequently very deeply held on to despite its irrationality. There are, however, other beliefs that 
make such a belief more plausible. For example, the belief in the existence of an omnipotent and 
good God can lead a person to expect that one day this God will hold the wrongdoer to account and 
will restore the wronged. It could be a belief that leads people to hold on to their resentment. The 
paradox that exists is that for many people this omnipotent and good God is one who expects them 
to forgive others, even their enemies.
5. Conclusion
This paper has provided a description of what forgiveness is through the ‘bond model,’ and what 
forgiveness does through the ‘economic model.’ It has argued that it is the nature of forgiveness to 
aim at reconciliation, even though it does not always achieve it. It has also argued that it is possible 
for a wrongdoer to be forgiven by the wronged, while remaining unable to receive this forgiveness 
because she has not repented. In such a case the wrongdoer remains guilty, while the wronged is in 
the process of releasing herself from the bond that binds her to the wrongdoer by choosing to 
release the wrongdoer from the debt she owes her.
The paper has argued that forgiveness is understood as a good action within a framework 
that considers being in good relationships as the sommum bonum of an agent. This reveals the 
importance of forgiveness as the action and the process that can restore such relationships once they 
have been damaged through evil actions. This paper has also argued that for forgiveness to be at all 
possible, agents have to be of such a kind as to have the capacity for language. This is also clear as 
the process of forgiveness is strongly affected by narrative and truth. Finally, this paper argued that 
forgiveness is always costly for the wronged and that there are wrongs that seem to be unforgivable 
because of the ‘magnitude’ of the wrong. This, However, may not be the case if, as the Christian 
narrative suggests, it is true that divine assistance is available and accessible.
Much remains to be said about forgiveness. Only one simple case of forgiveness has been 
discussed here. It is also important to note that understanding forgiveness may be helpful, but it by 
no means makes it easier to forgive. The difficulty of the action and of the process is not due to the 
confusion surrounding them, but in the most part due to the nature of the agents involved, the nature 
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of wrongdoing and the nature of the relationships in question. Nevertheless, clearing up the 
confusion removes an extra layer of difficulty and enables better articulation and so better 
communication about forgiveness. This is by no means an insignificant achievement.
“His eyes open wide. «Oh my God, did you just say that?» he gasps. Before I know 
it, his arms wrap around me and sweep me tight up against him like a ragdoll. I 
hug him back, surprised by his strong reaction when the sobs tear through his 
throat. His crying shakes my body, and I hear myself whisper into his ear: «It’s 
over. I forgive you. It’s over.» We embrace for a long while before he lets go of me, 
wipes a tear from his cheek, and says: «I accept your forgiveness.»”  118
 Elva and Stranger (2017): 261-262.118
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